California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations

Office of Graduate Studies

8-2021

Does Working Memory Capacity Modulate the Relationship
between Intentional Mind-Wandering and Task Demand?
Stephen Ware

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd
Part of the Cognition and Perception Commons, and the Cognitive Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Ware, Stephen, "Does Working Memory Capacity Modulate the Relationship between Intentional MindWandering and Task Demand?" (2021). Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations. 1283.
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/1283

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Graduate Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

DOES WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY MODULATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TASK DEMAND AND INTENTIONAL MIND WANDERING?

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Psychological Science

by
Stephen Le Vern Ware Jr.
August 2021

DOES WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY MODULATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TASK DEMAND AND INTENTIONAL MIND WANDERING?

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

by
Stephen Le Vern Ware Jr.
August 2021
Approved by:

Hideya Koshino, Committee Chair, Psychology

John Clapper, Committee Member

Robert Ricco, Committee Member

© 2021 Stephen Le Vern Ware Jr.

ABSTRACT
Mind wandering (MW) is affected by multiple factors. Among those factors, the
present study investigated the effects of working memory capacity on task
demands on types of mind-wandering. It was hypothesized that individuals with
high working memory capacity (WMC) would show more intentional mind
wandering in a low demanding task, and in this case, task performance would not
be impaired. On the other hand, individuals with low working memory capacity
would show more unintentional mind wandering in the high demand condition;
therefore, task performance would be affected. Task demand was manipulated
with verbal n-back tasks and WMC was measured with working memory span
tasks. The hypotheses were not supported by the results. It was found that
intentional MW occurred more frequently in the high demand condition relative to
the low demand condition, while no difference was found between conditions for
unintentional MW. Additionally, in the high demand condition, individuals with
high WMC were more likely to have performance decline as unintentional MW
increased. Furthermore, a positive relationship between WMC and motivation
was observed. Theoretical implications are discussed.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................. viii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………...1
Measures of Mind-Wandering .................................................................... 2
Working Memory Capcity ........................................................................... 6
The N-back Task ....................................................................................... 7
Theoretical Frameworks of Mind-Wandering ............................................. 8
Intentional and Unintentional Mind-Wandering ........................................ 15
Task Demands, Mind-Wandering and Working Memory Capacity ........... 17
CHAPTER TWO: CURRENT STUDY……………………………………………….24
Methods ................................................................................................... 25
Participants ................................................................................... 25
Materials ....................................................................................... 26
Procedure ..................................................................................... 28
Design and Data Analysis ............................................................. 29
Results ..................................................................................................... 29
N-back and Task Performance...................................................... 31
Mind-Wandering ............................................................................ 32
Correlations ................................................................................... 36
CHAPTER THREE: DISCUSSION…………………………………………………..40
Limitations in the current study and Furture reserach .............................. 44

v

APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS ......................................................................... 48
APPENDIX B: IRB APPROVAL .......................................................................... 50
REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 51

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations ........................................................... 30
Table 2. Correlation Matrix ................................................................................. 37
Table 3. Correlation Matrix by Group.................................................................. 39

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Stimulus display .................................................................................. 27
Figure 2. Accuracy in N-back Tasks ................................................................... 32
Figure 3. Overall Mind-wandering....................................................................... 33
Figure 4. Intentional and Unintentional Mind-Wandering .................................... 34
Figure 5. Intentional and Unintentional Mind-Wandering for Working Memory Capacity
........................................................................................................................... 36

viii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The tendency for thoughts to drift from a current task into unrelated thoughts,
such as daydreaming or planning, can be referred to as mind-wandering (MW) or taskunrelated-thoughts (TUTs) (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; McVay & Kane, 2009). This
phenomenon is a mainstream topic in cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
Recently, research on MW has been carried out in education (e.g., Pachai, Acai &
LoGiudice, 2016; Kane, Smeekens & Von Bastian, 2017), in driving (e.g., Baldwin,
Roberts & Barragan, 2017), and in aging (e.g., Maillet, Beaty, Jordano & Touron, 2018).
For example, Wammes (2016) showed that undergraduate students’ MW rates fluctuate
in lectures throughout a 12-week semester. Kane et al (2007), showed that 30% of
thought content consists of MW in a day. The prevalence of research on MW has grown
across the field of psychology and neuroscience.
Experimental designs within cognitive psychology and neuroscience were
previously content with controlling the occurrence of MW because MW has been
considered as “noise” (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng & Andrews-Hanna, 2016). When
the default mode network (DMN) was discovered to be the most active regions of the
brain during rest (e.g., Mason et al., 2007), “noise” became a topic of interest in
attention research. Mind wandering was defined as “a shift in the contents of thought
away from an ongoing task and/or from events in the external environment” (Smallwood
& Schooler, 2015). This definition emphasizes MW as thoughts that are characterized
by its content (Christoff et al., 2016); however, it does not reflect on how these thoughts
arise or change over time. Rumination is a negative emotion-based MW episode, where
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an individual shifts their thought to personal concerns while engaging in a task
(Smallwood & O’Connor,2013). In general, thoughts are dynamic in nature and our
definition of MW should include a broad perspective that includes personal concerns
and goals (Christoff et al., 2016).

Measures of Mind-Wandering
According to Weinstein (2018), the state of MW is typically captured by two
different methods. The first and most common is a subjective method which is
observed through self-report of participant’s own internal states and relies on metacognition. Within the subjective method there are two sub-methods: probe-caught and
self-caught methods. In the probe-caught method, a probe is presented at one point
during a task. The probe might be an open-ended question, which asks participants to
report their thinking verbatim in response to a probe. This methodology is used less due
to the need for experimenters to individually collect data and code the thoughts. The
more popular method uses closed-ended questions, in which participants are asked to
respond to thought probes on either a dichotomous or Likert scale. For example, the
probe could be a question “Were you on task or MW?”, and participants are presented
with two options: “on task” or “off-task/MW” (Kam & Handy, 2014). Another example of
thought probe might be “Stop. Please indicate whether you were on-task or off-task, just
prior to the onset of this screen,” and participants have six points on a Likert scale with
“on-task” on one side and “completely off task” on the other side (Levinson, Smallwood
& Davidson, 2012).

2

Self-caught methods require participants to indicate when their attention has
shifted away from the task. The self-caught method is more in line to an actual MW
episode due to the likelihood that when an individual mind-wanders, they respond to an
internal cue rather than an external cue (i.e., thought probe) (Varao-Sousa & Kingstone,
2019). While the ecological validity of this method is superior, there is a lack of
experimental control. Altogether, the self-caught method is used less frequently
because it requires participants to monitor their thought processes during the task
(Schooler, 2002).
As a survey research method, thought probes have conceptual issues in
collecting data and making empirical inferences. For example, Vinski & Watter (2012)
demonstrated that demand characteristics play a role in higher reports of MW. On the
contrary, there is also evidence supporting the claim that the presence of thought
probes does not influence task performance or frequency of MW (Wiemers & Redick,
2019). When using thought probes, there are four key components to understanding
how participants might answer questions: (1) understanding the question, (2) utilizing
relevant information from memory, (3) extracting a single answer, and (4) mapping their
answer to an available response (Krosnick & Presser, 2010). In regard to thought
probes, understanding the question is not an issue because participants typically get
some practice trials with primary tasks and thought probes. The second component is
also not an issue as most probes are asking participants of the current content of
thoughts in the moment (not relying on long-term memory, Weinstein, 2018). However,
the third and fourth components are relevant for probe caught MW, as the wording of
the probes and the available responses might influence how an individual will respond.
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Thus, participants could use heuristics or biases when answering thought probes, such
as; optimizing or satisfying social desirability and acquiescence bias. Another
methodological issue that should be considered when using self-report measures is that
individuals have the tendency to respond to the ‘best’ or more desirable option to
attempt to satisfy the experimenter. Additionally, the amount of thought probes
presented in a task can create response biases resulting in a high report of mind
wandering episodes (Seli, Carriere, Levene & Smilek, 2013).
The second method is objective/indirect measures, which has been empirically
evaluated by task-performance variables (i.e. accuracy). For example, research has
investigated the effect of training in mindfulness meditation on MW, using a Sustained
Attention to Response Task (SART) (Rahl et al., 2017). SART is a computerized task
that instructs participants to respond to high frequent non-targets and to withhold a
response from low frequent targets. For example, digits 1-9 are shown one at a time
and participants are required to press a key except for 3. MW was measured by
discrimination rate in the SART, calculated by the number of correct responses to nontargets minus the number of incorrect responses to non-targets (Rahl et al., 2017).
Participants were randomly assigned to three brief mindfulness training conditions that
differed in the way instructions were given. One condition focused on attention
monitoring and acceptance, the second condition focused on attention monitoring only,
and the third condition emphasized relaxation training or active reading. Before the
training sessions, participants were measured on dispositional mindfulness and
completed the SART. The training sessions were administered via audio tapes for three
consecutive days and then were followed by a SART. It was found that the attention-
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monitoring plus acceptance mindfulness group showed a higher discrimination rate
compared to the active control groups, suggesting that mindfulness reduces the amount
of MW in the SART.
Cheyne, Carriere and Smilek (2006) investigated a relationship between SART
performance and a subjective measure of attention lapse based on the Cognitive
Failure Questionnaire (CFQ) developed by Broadbent et al. (1982). It was found that
the measure of attention lapse and the SART performance were related. In another
study by Reichle, Reineberg & Schooler, (2010), eye movement was utilized as a
physiological measure while reading to assess mindless reading. Participants were
instructed to read Sense and Sensibility by Jane Austen over multiple days, while the
eye movements measurement provided information on when an individual would ‘zoneout’ (self-caught and probe-caught MW). Results reveled that fixation-duration (e.g.
duration of fixation on a word during the first read) was longer when people mindwandered with awareness (self-caught). Secondly, it was found that people were more
likely to look elsewhere when mindlessly reading compared to normal reading;
suggesting that readers started MW when they are not looking at the text. Furthermore,
eye-movements are an indication that an individual is engaged in lexical and linguistic
processing while reading but not MW. These studies provide empirical evidence that
objective measures of MW correlate with subjective measures. Measuring MW can be
objective/indirect with reaction times, eye movements and other physiological measures
or subjective/direct through self-caught and probe caught methods. MW has been
measured and assessed thoroughly in the literature, with multiple ways to empirically
gather information on an individual’s thought content during a task, other interlevel
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differences have been associated with the tendency to mind-wander. Specifically,
individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) have shown to predict levels
of MW.

Working Memory Capacity
In its original version, Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) model of working memory
assumes three subdivisions of working memory: (1) the central executive, (2)
visuospatial sketch pad and (3) phonological loop. This tripartite system emphasizes
attentional control with the central executive, verbal information for phonological loop
and manipulation of visuospatial information for visuospatial sketchpad. The two slave
systems in working memory compete for attentional resources that are influenced by
limited resources. Later, a fourth component was added, an episodic buffer, which
facilitates the storage of how information binds into long-term memory due to conscious
awareness for retrieval (Baddeley, 2000).
In the decades following, working memory have been measured in labs through
methods that incorporate a processing and storage component, known as complex
span tasks (CST). In contrast, simple span tasks (e.g., Digit Span) do not incorporate a
processing component and only measure storage processes in short-term memory
(Redick et al., 2012). Commonly used CSTs include Operation Span (OSPAN) (verbal
and arithmetic) (Turner & Engle, 1989), Reading Span (RSPAN) (verbal) (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980), and Symmetry Span (SSPAN) (spatial) (Shah & Miyake, 1996). There
are two theoretical perspectives on what these tasks measure. There is a domainspecific perspective, focusing on the content of the task and its outcomes (Oswald et al,
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2015). The domain-specific perspective has support via convergent and discriminant
validity, showing a high correlation between specific working memory tasks and their
specific outcomes (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). For example, Shah and Miyake
(1996) found a distinction in verbal-spatial abilities in individual’s performances in the
RSPAN and SSPAN. According to Oswald and colleagues (2015) the domain-general
perspective emphasizes that the processing, storage and recall components of working
memory tasks are the same. Support for this perspective comes from distinguishing
latent variables from observable variables. For example, in latent variable modeling,
WMC is operationalized by the high correlations between verbal and spatial CST (e.g.
Engle et al 1999). Additionally, Kane et al. (2007) showed that all CST accounted for
variances in verbal and spatial abilities. Outside of the complex span tasks the n-back
task has been used as a measure of working memory (e.g. Kane et al., 2007; Jaeggi,
Buschkuehl, Perrig & Meier, 2010; Schmiedek et al., 2009).

The N-back Task
The n-back task instructs individuals to match stimuli presented in a sequence
that appeared n items ago. It was originally described as a visuo-spatial task with load
factors ranging from 0-6 (Kirchner, 1958; Mackworth, 1959). According to Jonides et al
(1997), encoding, storage, rehearsal, matching, temporal ordering, inhibition and
response processes are needed to successfully perform the n-back task. Encoding
processes refer to the interpretation of stimuli, storage and rehearsal processes to keep
relevant information in working memory, matching to make a decision, temporal
ordering to recall the order in which stimuli is presented, inhibition to reduce interference
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from previous trials and response to make the final decision. However, the n-back and
CST do not measure the same construct. For example, Kane et al., (2007) showed that
the n-back task demands recognition and is not related to serial recall demands in CST.
However, when the n-back task was modified by presenting participants with words
instead of numbers or letters, there was a strong positive correlation with OSPAN
(Shelton, Metzger, & Elliot, 2007); furthermore, the n-back task incorporates processes
associated with recognition demands, such that individuals have to manipulate
information in working memory then recognize if stimuli were presented n items ago. In
conclusion, the n-back tasks are a measure of individual differences in working memory
and is a useful tool for research in working memory because they can predict individual
differences in fluid intelligence in manipulating levels of load (i.e. 0-back vs 2-back)
(Kane et al., 2017; Jaeggi et al., 2010).

Theoretical Frameworks for Mind-Wandering
WMC has been studied in various ways within cognitive psychology. It has been
suggested to be an important factor in MW. The executive failure model (McVay &
Kane, 2009) and resource demand model (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) are the
frequently mentioned models that emphasize the role of WMC in MW. According to the
resource demand model (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), MW occurs because
individuals are aware of the switch from on task thoughts to off task thoughts;
specifically, controlled processes formulate information into awareness and decoupling
processes allow working memory resources to play a role when internal stimuli
(thoughts) interfere with the external environment. Therefore, MW occurs when
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controlled processes are minimal for a task, allowing freed working memory resources
to be allocated for MW. MW is linked with how information is controlled with awareness
and this can be observed with tasks that require an individual to allocate and maintain
information in WM. With WMC as an individual difference, the resource demand model
predicts that MW would occur less for individuals with lower WMC; suggesting that
working memory is needed for MW to exist.
The resource demand model has been supported with empirical evidence in
numerous studies (e.g. Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2012; Smallwood, 2013;
Smallwood& Schooler, 2006). Specifically, Levinson, Smallwood and Davidson (2012)
investigated how WMC would influence the amount of TUTs in demanding and
nondemanding tasks. Two hypotheses were examined: (1) maintenance of MW requires
WMC and (2) maintenance of MW is not supported by WMC, while MW decreases
during demanding tasks because attentional resources need to be allocated to the task.
Levinson, Smallwood and Davidson (2012), used a visual search task, in which
perceptual load was manipulated (i.e. high vs low). They also used a Breath
Awareness Task (BAT) with thought probes as a low demanding task. It was found that
individuals with higher WMC mind-wandered more during the low-load condition in the
visual search task but no relationship was found between WMC and MW in the highload condition. Individuals with higher WMC also mind-wandered more than the low
WMC individuals during the BAT. These findings supported the resource demand
model, such that WMC is needed for the maintenance of MW episodes.
Contrary to the resource demand model, McVay & Kane (2009) proposes that
MW is due to a failure in executive control influencing the frequency of automatically
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generated thoughts. Specifically, the episode of MW results from a failure to allocate
attention to a primary task, such that internal thoughts interfere with the external
environment. Instead of MW occurring due to substantial availability of attentional
resources, the executive failure model states MW occurs because the executive-control
system cannot efficiently control interfering thoughts. According to executive attention
theories, WMC measures the ability to control attention (Engle & Kane, 2004).
Therefore, individuals with lower WMC should have a higher frequency of MW episodes
compared to individuals with higher WMC. McVay and Kane (2009), examined WMC’s
predictive ability in determining whether individual differences in attention control and
MW are due to failure of executive functions including goal maintenance and neglect.
They attempted to find a link between goal-neglect errors and subjective experiences of
MW, using the SART with thought-probes (e.g. “what were you just thinking about?”).
The thought-probe had seven different responses: 1) task, 2) task performance, 3)
everyday stuff, 4) current state of being, 5) personal worries, 6) daydreams and 7)
other. Additionally, SART was administrated as a between subject factor with three
conditions (Semantic, perceptual, and perceptual-semantic). The SART instructed
participants to respond to non-targets and not respond to targets. In the semantic
SART, non-target words were from one category (e.g. animals) while another category
(e.g. foods) was used for targets. The categories were counter-balanced across
subjects. In the perceptual SART, non-target words (e.g. animals) were lower case
while target words (e.g. food) were upper case. Lastly the perceptual-semantic SART,
participants were instructed to make perceptual decisions with targets and nontargets
differing in both food and animal categories (e.g., animals vs FOODS). WMC variation
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predicted SART performance and MW, such that individuals with lower WMC had
higher rates of MW. Therefore, they concluded that MW is due to executive-control
failure to maintain goals in a primary task and generation of MW do not require WM
resources (McVay & Kane, 2009). These findings have been replicated and shown in
relation to everyday activities.
McVay, Kane and Kwapil (2009) investigated whether low WMC individuals have
a higher tendency to disengage from a task that was demanding and engage in MW.
The purpose of their study was to examine MW as a failure in executive control,
comparing laboratory findings to everyday life activities. They measured WMC by use of
complex span tasks (CST), and tested participants over a week in MW episodes.
Participants first completed a SART in their lab, based on perceptual and semantic
go/no-go responses with thought probes from McVay and Kane (2009). Then
participants were given a Palm Pilot, a portable device designed for scheduling,
allowing experimenters to ask participants to report their MW anytime throughout a day.
Specifically, the notification occurred at random approximately every 90 minutes,
between noon and midnight. The first question had a binary response, inquiring if
thoughts had wandered from their current activity, if participants indicated “yes”, then
five following questions were presented: (1) I was aware my mind was wandering in the
moments before the beep, (2) I allowed my thoughts to wander on purpose, (3) I was
thinking about personal concerns or things I need to do, (4) I was daydreaming or
fantasizing about something, and (5) I was worrying about something. Additionally, 18
questions were used to assess participants mental and environmental context (e.g., I
was doing this activity successfully, I like what I’m doing right now, I would prefer to do
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something else right now, and what I’m doing is mentally challenging). It was shown that
low WMC individuals had higher rates of MW in the SART and when they were
performing tasks that were effortful or required concentration in their daily life (i.e.
stressful, unappealing or boring activities). Similar findings were reported when
participants were instructed to complete a choice-response task and responding to
thought probes (Kane et al., 2007). Additionally, the executive failure model suggests
that MW influences the neglect of goals. It was found that individuals with lower WMC
mind wander more than people with high WMC due to attention lapses, and WMC
predicts goal neglect through MW episodes.
Both the resource demand model and executive failure model have been
examined in the MW literature and are inconsistent with how working memory capacity
plays a role in the frequency of MW. The inconsistency in findings could be due to the
tasks used when assessing MW. According to Robison and Unsworth (2017), most of
the literature utilized “high demanding” tasks that tax attention and cognitive processes
(e.g. SART, STOOP, antisaccade, flanker tasks, reading comprehension) to draw
conclusions on how WMC can predict the propensity to MW. However, there are also
some inconsistencies with using “low demanding” tasks (e.g. choice reaction time and
digit reaction time task). For example, Robison and Unsworth (2017) measured WMC
with CST, while using the choice reaction time and digit reaction time task as lowdemanding tasks and thought probes. Though the purpose of this study was to
determine if individuals with high WMC would mind wander more with thought contents
in future oriented thinking, it demonstrated that people with higher WMC showed less
mind wandering when a task was less demanding. In support, Miere (2019) attempted
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to replicate the positive relationship between WMC and MW using the Breathawareness task (BAT). The BAT had three separate sections: 1) the baseline section:
participants were instructed to be aware of their breathing in and out and were
presented with thought probes (i.e. Just now where was your attention and How aware
were you of where your attention was?), which were measured on a 6-point Likert scale;
2) the counting section: participants were instructed to count after each exhale and
press the letter “A”, followed by pressing the letter “F” on the ninth exhale and the
control key when they lost count, this section lasted 18 minutes with 12 thought probes;
3) the awareness section: participants were instructed to press the “L” key for every
exhale and to press control when they noticed they were off task, this section lasted 9
minutes with 6 pairs of thought probes. Their results showed no relationship between
WMC and MW. Contrary to these null finings, there is evidence to support a positive
relationship between WMC and MW (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Rummel
& Boywitt, 2014). A more recent model (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) has infused both
the resource demand model and executive failure model in terms of how WMC is
related to the tendency to mind-wander.
According to the Process-Occurrence Framework (POF) the initiation of MW is
due to a failure in executive control while working memory is needed for the
continuation of the MW episode (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). POF distinguishes
between the process and occurrence of a MW episode, stating that attentional control
can limit MW by the enabling of task dependent thoughts; however, once MW occurs,
perception of the external environment is taken over by internal thoughts that are not
involved with the primary task, causing impairments in task performance (Smallwood,
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2013). The empirical evidence of this model is derived from findings on four different
hypotheses on the generation of spontaneous thoughts: 1) the current concerns
hypothesis (Smallwood, 2013), 2) executive failure (McVay & Kane, 2009), 3) metaawareness hypothesis (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and 4) resource demand model
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2010). According to current concerns model,
MW occurs due to attention biases toward an individual’s personal concern (Smallwood,
2013), Additionally, the shift in attention from the task to internal thoughts is facilitated
by a higher sense of incentive value relative to the current task. According to the metaawareness hypothesis, MW occurs when there is no awareness of the shift in thought
content and that awareness of thought content returns at the end of an MW episode
(Schooler et al., 2011). Each of the models mentioned explains the occurrence of MW;
however, the resource demand model emphasizes the role of WMC in the continuation
of MW episodes (Smallwood,2013). Furthermore, POF is different from the resource
demand and executive failure models of MW, emphasizing that the occurrence and
processing of MW can only be understood in the context of the tasks demands. These
models have been the focal point of debate in the MW literature. Therefore, there needs
to be further distinctions in how MW occurs. Recently there have been a trend into
examining MW as either intentional or unintentional (Seli et al., 2016). The distinction
between intentionality of MW could provide benefits for practical and theoretical
implications for MW.
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Intentional and Unintentional Mind-Wandering
In recent years, there has been a resurgence in conceptualizing the difference
between intentional and unintentional MW. Smallwood and Schooler (2015) suggested
that future research would benefit by making a distinction between the two. A shift in
attention can be intentional, which requires an individual to have substantial control in
processing information or be motivated (Giambra, 1995). Additionally, shifting attention
can be unintentional (from primary task to internal thoughts) which implies an individual
to have less control over processing information and not be motivated to remain
engaged in a task (Giambra, 1995). According to Seli, Risko, Smilek and Schacter
(2016), the differences between intentionality of MW can have different subjective
experiences, such that, during unintentional MW there is a lack of consciousness in the
initiation of the episode and during intentional MW there is a conscious or deliberate
initiation of the episode. Individual differences could also play a role in distinguishing
how intentional and unintentional MW draw on different cognitive systems; for example,
there is evidence that unintentional MW is associated with attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), while there is no
relationship between intentional MW and ADHD/OCD (Seli et al 2015, 2016). This
implies that intentional and unintentional episodes could be uniquely associated with
individual differences.
The Executive failure model posits that MW occur due to a lack of executive
control contrary to the idea that working memory resources are needed to initiate and
engage in MW (i.e. Resource demand model) and that the process and occurrence of
MW are different (i.e. Process-occurrence framework). However, this is under the
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assumption that MW is unintentional. In laboratory settings, in conjunction to most
experimental manipulations, the tendency for unintentional MW was examined though
behavioral tasks and probe caught measures. However, when thought probes reflect
intentionality, 34% - 41% of MW is deliberate (intentional) (Seli et al., 2016). This
suggests that intentional MW stems from a lack in motivation to perform a task or
perceive the task to be relatively easy with a belief that performance will not be hindered
from MW. The theoretical framework in distinguishing intentionality of MW could be
analogous to the cognitive mechanisms in attention that distinguish between exogenous
and endogenous control (Seli et al., 2016). Specifically, intentional MW could be
compared to endogenous control, reflecting on a willful shift in attention; furthermore,
unintentional MW could be related to exogenous control, reflecting processes
associated with attentional capture. While exogenous control is associated with external
stimuli, in the context of unintentional MW the external stimuli would be the high
activation of an individual’s current concerns or primed concepts (Seli et al., 2016). In
this framework intentionality of MW could be interpreted as an integration of different
attention networks.
According to Seli et al (2016), experimental manipulations that separate
unintentional and intentional self-generated thoughts has significant impact on
understanding the cognitive mechanism for MW. This study utilized the SART with two
difficulty conditions, and a probe-caught method distinguishing between intentional and
unintentional MW. The difficult condition was the standard SART. The easy condition
was a modified SART, which followed the same procedure as the standard SART with
the exception that numbers were not randomized but sequentially presented (i.e. 1, 2, 3
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, 4…). Finally, thought probes were presented at the end of every block consisting of 45
trials, totaling 20 probes. One question was presented as the thought probe, “Which of
the following responses best characterizes your mental state just prior to the
presentation of this screen?”. There were three response options, “On task”,
“Intentionally MW” and “Unintentionally MW”. Seli and colleagues found there was no
differences in the frequency of MW across easy and hard conditions; however,
individuals reported higher intentional MW in the easy SART and higher unintentional
MW in the standard SART, suggesting that intentional MW in the easy SART can be
due to future oriented thinking based on the assumption that intentional MW can be a
strategic process that individuals use for planning or self-reflection (Baird, Smallwood &
Schooler, 2012; Smallwood, 2011) . Furthermore, they suggested future research
should not only look at the possible interaction between task difficulty and MW, but also
evaluate the role of working memory capacity in the relationship between task demand
and intentionality of MW.

Task Demands, Mind-Wandering and Working Memory Capacity
Further investigations into how WMC is related to situational demands for
benefits and costs of MW have led to context-regulation hypothesis (Smallwood &
Andrews-Hama, 2013) and cognitive flexibility hypothesis (Rummel & Boywitt, 2014).
According to the context-regulation hypothesis self-generated thoughts are regulated for
productivity; specifically, future oriented thoughts allow people to plan their futures
(Baird et al., 2011), while past oriented thoughts are associated with distress
(Smallwood & O’Conor, 2011). According to Baird et al., (2011), individuals with higher
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WMC tend to engage in future oriented thoughts when reporting MW, which benefits the
individual in a low demanding task. Baird et al., (2011) also showed that individuals with
lower WMC did not report higher rates of future oriented thinking compared to high
WMC individuals. However, contrary to expectations, there was not relationship
between WMC and past-oriented thought content when they mind wander. The contextregulation hypothesis stems from the resource demand model, such that it expands the
expected positive association between MW and WMC by adding a specific type of
thought content for individuals with higher WMC.
Like the context-regulation hypothesis, the cognitive flexibility hypothesis
emphasizes the role of WMC to be a beneficial factor in understanding how MW occurs
based on situational demands. According to Rummel and Boywitt (2014) individuals
with higher WMC would be able to adjust self-generated thoughts in context of task
demands. “TUT adjustment”, when individuals adjust the amount of MW based on the
situational demands, was the main concern in this study. To examine how task demand
facilities a reduction for MW for benefits to task performance, task demand was
manipulated as a within-subjects design using 1-back and 3-back task. Additionally,
working memory capacity was measured through automated OSPAN. Lastly,
participants were asked to estimate their performance in each task at the end of the
experiment and the CFQ was administered between tasks. “What were you just thinking
about?” was the probe used to measure MW with seven responses: (1) the current task,
(2) my performance, (3) everyday stuff, (4) my current state of being, (5) my personal
worries, (6) daydreams, and (7) other task-unrelated stuff. MW rates was computed as
the frequency of off-task thoughts, with 3-7 being considered episodes of MW, in both
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conditions. It was found that MW occurred more in the 1-back task than the 3-back task,
and that high WMC individuals reported higher rates of MW compared to low WMC
individuals in the 1-back condition. Additionally, high WMC individuals reported lower
rates of MW compared to low WMC individuals in the 3-back condition. Performance in
the 1-back task was higher compared to the 3-back task. Individuals with high WMC
had fewer declines in task performance as task demand increases relative to low WMC
individuals. In supporting the idea that MW effects task performance, individuals with
higher WMC were able to adjust the rates of MW based on situational demands. This is
further evidence that there is a positive relationship between WMC and MW in a low
demanding task and a negative relationship between WMC and MW in a high
demanding task.
The cognitive flexibility hypothesis and the empirical evidence from Rummel and
Boywit (2014) show that WMC is a moderating variable in the relationship between task
demand and MW, making the linear predictions form the resource demand and
executive failure model to be lackluster in understanding the cognitive mechanism of
MW. Regarding consistencies with a negative relationship between WMC and MW
during a high demanding task, Froster and Lavie (2009) used a visual search task and
manipulated perceptual load and found that MW was lower in the high perceptual load
task compared to the low perceptual load. Though they did not measure WMC, it was
suggested that when attentional capacity is taxed in a demanding task, information
processing for MW is reduced. In low demanding tasks there is mixed evidence for how
WMC relates to the frequency of MW, some have found a positive relationship between
WMC and MW (Levinson et al. 2012, 2014), while most have found a negative
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relationship (e.g., Meire, 2019; Robinson & Unsworth, 2017; Unsworth & McMillan 2013,
2014). These contradictions indicate that task demands reduce the likelihood for
attentional resources to be allocated towards internal distractors. Contrary to this
evidence, there have been studies showing no difference in the frequency of MW by
task demands and WMC (Seli, Risko & Smilek, 2016; Meire, 2019).
Due to the inconsistency with how task demand influences rates of MW, it has
been suggested that multiple predictors contribute to cognitive mechanisms of MW
(Randall et al 2019). While the executive failure model and resource demand model
account for most data in the last decade, there are findings that do not support one
model better than the other. Randall and colleagues (2019) attempted to predict MW
from individual characteristics and the task difficulty. This study focused on resource
theories (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), which combine individual difference variables with
task characteristics to determine how attention plays a role in performance; additionally,
the resource allocation framework states that self-regulatory strategies are used to
allocate attentional resources to different activities or thoughts. When tasks are
extremely high or low in demands they are referred to as “resource insensitive”,
meaning that any effort put forward to the task will not make a difference in task
performance. Therefore, only resource sensitive tasks, in which task demands are
within an individual’s capability, will capture any variation in effort and attention for
performing a task (Randall et al., 2019). In Randall et al. (2019), task difficulty was
manipulated through use of math questions: Easy problems were 155 5th grade math
questions, moderate condition included 42 SAT questions, and the difficult problems
were 23 GRE quantitative questions. MW was assessed using a post-hoc scale,
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Attention Regulation Scale (ARS) (Randall & Beier, 2017). ARS is a 7-item scale, in
which participants are provided with a Likert scale (i.e. “I thought about other activities”,
“I daydreamed while doing the task”,” I let my mind wander while doing the task”). In the
first experiment, task difficulty was a between subject factor. The second experiment
adopted a within subject manipulation of task difficulty; and, the third experiment added
a “very low” condition which had participants complete 924 simple addition problems.
MW was found to be more frequent in the easy and hard condition (experiment 1).
Additionally, working memory-capacity modulated the relationship between MW and
task difficulty. Individuals with higher WMC engaged in more MW in the easy condition
and as task-demand increased MW decreased, while lower WM individuals showed a
positive association between task demand and MW. Lastly, Randall et al. (2019), found
that task demand modulated the relationship between MW and task performance,
showing that more MW resulted in lower performance in the high demand condition but
not in the low demand condition. WMC did not moderate the relationship between MW
and task performance. These findings provide support for resource theoretical
frameworks and show that WMC modulates the relationship between task demand and
MW.
Randall et al (2019), was able to demonstrate that WMC modulates the
relationship between task demand and MW; however, the study did not evaluate the
role of intentionality in MW. Ju and Lien (2018), assessed intentionality with WMC and
task demand. They manipulated task demand with use of a modified n-back task. For
the easy condition, a 0-back task was used, for the hard condition a 2-back task was
used. The N-back task was modified by having participants respond to color digits (i.e.
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red digits were targets) and not responding to the non-targets which were white
numbers. Specifically, participants were instructed to determine if the digit displayed
before the present target was odd or even when the item is red by pressing keys on a
keyboard for the 0-back task. For the 2-back task, participants were instructed to
determine whether the digit presented two digits before was odd or even when the
present digit is red. Thought probes were used to assess MW, and they were presented
at the end of each block for both n-back tasks. There was a total of 8 blocks in each
task, each having a different number of trails (i.e. 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 30, 33, or 36 trials),
totaling 189 trails per n-back task. At the end of each block for each N-back task three
thought probes were presented, the first asked what they were doing at the moment.
There were eight separate options: (1) concentrating on the numbers without thinking
about anything else, (2) thinking about their performance or about the task, (3) having a
mind blank, (4) noticing some feelings in their body, (5) recalling the past, (6) planning
something, (7) thinking other thoughts that did not fit into the other categories, and (8)
could not judge what was being done. The second probe asked, “Were you aware of
what you were doing just then?” with two responses. Lastly, “Did you intend to do that?”,
with two response options. Additionally, working memory capacity was measured using
a Chinese version of OSPAN. Working memory capacity was measured first by the
modified n-back tasks. Results showed that WMC modulated the relationship between
task demand and MW. It was found that MW occurred more often in the 0-back task,
though there was no relationship between working memory capacity and performance in
the 0-back task. However, the low working memory capacity group mind-wandered
more than high working memory capacity group in the 2-back task compared to the 0-
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back task. For intentionality of MW, there was lower instances of intentional and
unintentional MW in the 2-back task compared to the 0-back task. WMC did not
influence the amount of intentional MW in either conditions. For unintentional MW,
individuals with lower working memory capacity reported higher unintentional MW in the
2-back task compared to individuals with higher working memory capacity but no
differences between WMC groups for unintentional MW in the 0-back task. For task
performance, WMC and MW did not predict performance in the 0-back task; however,
there was a positive relationship between working memory capacity and performance in
the 2-back task and no relationship with MW.
In summary, Ju and Lien (2018) found that working memory capacity was
negatively related to unintentional MW in the 2-back task, working memory capacity
does not influence the tendency to intentionally mind-wander in either conditions,
unintentional MW occurs more often as task demand increases for low working memory
individuals. These findings suggest working memory capacity only plays a role in the
tendency to mind-wander when top-down regulation (i.e. deliberate attention) is needed
for a task. While this is one of the first studies to incorporate different types of MW in the
relationship with WMC, it shows that there could be separate mechanisms for types of
MW when looking at WMC, task demand and performance.
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CHAPTER TWO
CURRENT STUDY
Recently, literature in MW has shifted to incorporate an operational definition that
includes the possibility that MW can be an intentional mental state. When empirically
tested, there are differences between intentional and unintentional MW; however, the
role of WMC and other inter-individual differences could have further theoretical
implications. According to Robison, Miller and Unsworth (2020), MW is a multi-faceted
phenomenon that includes more than one distinct predictor for evaluating the
occurrence of intentional and unintentional MW. They measured WMC and attention
control (AC) through a variety of tasks (e.g., complex span tasks, antisaccade, Stroop,
and N-back task) which were labeled “cognitive variables”. They measured state
variables with use of questionnaires and labeled them “contextual variables” (e.g.,
motivation, mood, and alertness) and trait variables (e.g., personality and mindfulness
traits) and called them “dispositional variables”. Lastly, MW was assessed during the
WMC and AC tasks with “Please characterize your current conscious experience”;
furthermore, there were 6 different responses. Regarding the predictive ability of
individual differences in cognitive ability, they found evidence that supports resource
demand models, such that in high demanding task cognitive ability was negatively
associated with MW. In the low demanding task, there was no relationship between
cognitive ability and MW. However, cognitive ability was positively associated with
intentional MW in low demanding tasks. The results suggest that individuals with better
cognitive ability are likely to intentionally MW during a low demanding task. The
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dispositional and contextual variables also played a role in the occurrence and
maintenance of MW episodes, further suggesting that people mind-wander for several
reasons.
The current study aims to further evaluate MW as a multi-faceted phenomenon
while also integrating the resource demand model (e.g.,Smallwood & Schooler, 2015;
Randall et al., 2019) and the executive failure model (McVay & Kane,2009). It was
hypothesized that individuals with higher working memory will show more intentional
MW, compared to low working memory in the low demanding task as predicted from the
resource demand model, and MW would not be related to performance decline.
However, low working memory individuals will show more unintentional MW in the high
demanding task as predicted by the executive failure model, and there would be a
negative relationship between MW and task performance for low working memory
individuals.

Methods
Participants
Ninety-three undergraduate students (NFemale = 86, MAge = 28) were recruited via
SONA for this study. Among the participants, 52.3% were Seniors, 45.3% were Juniors
and 2.3% were Sophomores. For English fluency, 80.2% were native speakers.
Additionally, 90.7% of the participants were right-handed, 8.1 % were left-handed and
1.2% were ambidextrous. Students signed an informed consent approved by the
university’s institutional review board (see APPENDIX B).
Materials
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All materials/instructions were sent via email to students’ accounts (See
Appendix). For the Complex SPAN tasks and N-back tasks, Google Drive was used for
students to download on to their computers. Students were required to have a Windows
desktop or laptop for the programs to be downloaded and used. Specifically, the
computerized tasks were administered through E-Prime Go (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Consent forms, debriefing statement, and questionnaires were
sent separately as Word documents via email.
Complex SPAN tasks. The shortened versions of the Operation span task
(OSPAN), Reading span task (RSPAN) and Symmetry span (SSPAN) task were utilized
to assess individual differences in WMC (Oswald et al., 2015). During OSPAN
participants were presented with arithmetic operations then asked to determine if the
solution provided was true or false. A letter was presented after each judgment, in which
participants were instructed to recall after the completion of a set (set sizes 4-6). During
RSPAN participants were presented with sentences then asked to determine if the
sentence was sensible. A letter was presented after each judgment, in which
participants were instructed to recall after completion of each set (set sizes 4-6). During
SSPAN participants were presented with a set of 8 x 8 matrices and a few squares were
filled with black to form a pattern, then they were instructed to judge if the patterns were
symmetrical along the vertical midline. Participants were then instructed to recall letters
that appeared after each judgment (set sizes 3-5). The final WMC scores were
computed by taking the average of all Total Span scores.
N-back tasks. To manipulate task demands, two versions of the verbal N-back
task were used (1-back and 3-back tasks) (see Figure 1). Twenty letters ( i.e., the entire

26

alphabet excluding U, V, W, X, Y, and Z) were used for the presentation of stimuli,
which were 38 in font size and in Consolas style. A letter was presented for 1500 ms
against a grey background, followed by a 1-s intertrial interval. In the 1-back version,
participants were instructed to press A with their left index finger if the presented letter
matched the previous one and L with their right index finger if it did not match. The
same key assignments were used in the 3-back version to indicate whether the letter
matched the letter presented 3 letters earlier. A letter sequence consisted of 36 or 48
letters, and the target appeared 6 times.

Figure 1: Stimulus display for verbal 1-back and 3-back tasks.
Thought Probes. A Probe-caught method was used to assess MW and was
presented at the end of each block of the n-back task. Following Seli et al (2015),
participants were instructed to respond to the question: “Which of the following
responses best characterize your mental state during the recent task?” The following
response options were provided: “(1) on task”, “(2) intentionally MW” and “(3)
unintentionally MW”. Participants were instructed to press the corresponding numbers
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to represent their type of MW (i.e., “1” for on task, “2” for intentional, and “3” for
unintentional).
Questionnaires. A demographic sheet was used to collect participants’ age,
gender, class standing, ethnicity, handedness, English fluency, and history of
psychological/neurological conditions. Additionally, two questions were utilized to
assess participants’ motivation during the task (i.e., “How motivated were you to do well
on the task” and “How much did your overall motivation influence your performance on
the task” ) (Robinson & Unsworth, 2015). A Likert scale was used for ratings, ranging for
1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). Lastly the Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale
(MAAS) (Brown & Ryan, 2003), a 15-item survey assessing core characteristics of
dispositional mindfulness, was given.
Procedure
Data were collected via E-Prime Go, and participants were given instructions via
email, which included google link drives for the computerized tasks (see Appendix A).
Participants were sent the consent form, debriefing statement and questionnaires as
Word and/or PDF files. The consent form was sent with instructions, and the
experimenter received the signed consent form via email. WMC was measured using
the shortened complex WM tasks (OSPAN, RSPAN and SSPAN in that order), which
participants downloaded on to their computers. Upon completing the complex WM
tasks, the n-back tasks followed, which were presented randomly. Participants were
given specific instructions for each n-back task to indicate whether they were doing the
1-back or 3-back task. Participants were also instructed on the response for thought
probes. First, participants completed practice blocks for both the 1-back and 3-back
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task. There were 24 trials per block with thought probes presented at the end of each
block. Participants completed eight blocks for each n-back condition after the practice
blocks. There were two types of blocks varying in number of trials (i.e., 36 and 48 trials
per block). Additionally, the target appeared 6 times in each block. After completing all
computerized tasks, the demographics and MAAS were sent and collected. It is
important to note that this experiment was self-paced because it was administered
online.
Design and Data Analysis
A 3 x 2 mixed design was utilized in the current study. The following independent
variables (IV) were manipulated: task demand was a within-subject factor (High [3-back]
vs Low [1-back]) following Rummel & Boywitt (2014) and WMC was a between-subject
factor, created with a tercile split. The dependent variables (DV) were the proportions of
intentional and unintentional MW and accuracy in both 1-back and 3-back tasks.
Additionally, bivariate correlations were computed between WMC groups for all task
performance variables (i.e., accuracy and RT), MW, motivation and MASS.

Results
Of the 93 participants, 13 were excluded from the analyses. These exclusions
were determined based on performance measures in the n-back tasks. Initially,
individuals with 0 % accuracy in either the 1-back or 3-back condition and having an
average RT less than 200 ms were removed from the sample. Subsequently, the mean
(M) and standard deviations (SD) were computed for accuracy and reaction time for
each n-back task. Participants who had RT or error rate outside of M ± (2.5 x SD) for
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each performance measure were identified as outliers and were excluded. The final
sample size for the current study was 72; furthermore, when split by WMC, 25 were
grouped into the low WMC group, 26 into the middle WMC group and 21 into the high
WMC group. The n-back task performance, MW rates, MAAS, and Motivation are
shown in Table 1 for the three groups.
Table 1
Means and Standard
Deviations
Nback
Conditio
n

RT

MW
ACC

OT

INT

UIN

High WMC
(M = .88)

1-back

634
(95)

.87
(.08)

.52
(.26)

.17
(.24)

.30
(.20)

3-back

707
(99)

.68
(.16)

.48
(.32)

.18
(.23)

.33
(.24)

Middle
WMC
(M = .77)

1-back

626
(77)

.83
(.10)

.45
(.27)

.11
(.14)

.46
(.24)

3-back

667
(111)

.48
(.18)

.29
(.24)

.30
(.25)

.41
(.25)

Low WMC
(M = .57)

1-back

606
(93)

.76
(.13)

.40
(.24)

.20
(.20)

.40
(.20)

3-back

686
(126)

.47
(.18)

.37
(.31)

.25
(.20)

.39
(.25)

MAAS

Motivati
on

3.91
(.85)

5.71
(.56)

3.90
(.81)

5.38
(.90)

3.72
(.91)

4.96
(.98)

Note: Mean (M), reaction time (RT, in ms), accuracy (ACC), and type of mind-wandering (MW) for each
WMC group. OT: on task, INT: intentional mind wandering, and UIN: unintentional mind wandering.
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Accuracy was computed by taking the average for correct target trials. For
accuracy, there was a main effect of task demand, F (1,69) = 193.025, p < .001, p2 =
.737; showing that participants performed better in the 1-back condition compared to the
3-back condition. There was also a significant main effect of WMC, F (2,69) = 11.765, p
< .001, p2 = .152, showing differences among WMC groups. There was a significant
interaction between WMC and task demand, F (2,69) = 6.187, p =.003, p2 = .152, as
shown in Figure 2. In the 1-back condition, high WMC group had higher accuracy
compared to the low MWC group, t (44) = 3.475, p = .001, d = .531, and the middle
WMC group showed higher accuracy than the low WMC group, t (49) = 2.371, p = .022,
d = .346, but there was no difference between the high and middle WMC groups, t (45)
= 1.421, p =.162. In the 3-back condition, the high WMC had higher accuracy compared
to the low WMC group, t (44) = 4.214, p < .001, d = .621, and the middle WMC group, t
(45) = 4.141, p < .001, d = .604. There was no difference between the low and middle
WMC groups in the 3-back condition, t (49) = .144, p = .886. Altogether, the high WMC
group had better performance relative to the low WMC group in both conditions.
RT was computed by averaging across trial types for each n-back task for the
correct target trials. There was a main effect of task demand, F (1,69) = 28.747, p <
.001, p2 = .294. Therefore, participants had shorter RT in the 1-back task relative to the
3-back task. There was no effect of WMC, F (2,69) = .561, p = .573, p2 = .016 . There
was no significant interaction, F (2,69) = 1.101, p = .338, p2 = .031. Altogether, the
current study showed that task demand affected RT but that WMC did not affect RT.
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Figure 2: Accuracy in N-back Tasks

Mind-wandering
In the current study, MW was an ipsative measure; specifically, participants
chose between intentional and unintentional MW when reporting their state of mind
during the n-back task. Since the current study aimed to examine the variances in MW
based on intentionality, the proportions of intentional and unintentional MW were
utilized. There were 8 thought probes for each n-back task. The proportions were
computed by taking the total frequency of MW and dividing by the total number of
thought probes for each n-back task (Seli et al., 2016), and they are shown in Table 1
and Figure 3. First a 3 (WMC) x 2 (task demand) mixed ANOVA was used with the
overall MW (i.e., the sum of intentional and unintentional MW proportions). There was a
significant main effect of task demand, F (1,69) = 4.351, p = .041, p2 = .059, showing
more MW in the 3-back condition compared to the 1-back condition. Secondly, there
was a no significant main effect of WMC, F (2,69) = 2.469, p = .092, p2 = .067. Lastly,
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there was no significant interaction between WMC and task demand, F (2, 69) = 1.005,
p =.371, p2 = .067. However, post-hoc t tests revealed that in the 1-back condition,
there was no difference between the high and middle WMC groups, t (45) = 1.114, p =
.271, middle and low WMC groups, t (49) = .513, p = .61, and the high and low WMC, t
(44) = 1.665, p = .103. In the 3-back condition, the high WMC group showed less MW
than the middle WMC, t (45) = 2.316, p = .025, d = .337, but there was no difference
between the middle and low WMC, t (49) = 1.005, p = .32, and between high and low
WMC, t (44) = 1.211, p = .232. Collapsing across n-back tasks, post hoc t tests
determined that MW occurred more in the 3-back task compared to the 1-back task only
for the middle WMC group, t (25) = 2.418, p = .023, d = .48.

0.9

Proportion of Overall Mind-Wandering
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1-back
0.4
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0.3
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0.1
0
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Middle
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Working Memory Capacity Groups

Figure 3: Overall Mind-Wandering
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Figure 4: Intentional and Unintentional Mind-Wandering
To further examine the hypotheses on the intentionality of MW and WMC, the
proportions of intentional and unintentional MW were separated and treated as a withinsubjects variables (e.g., Seli et al 2016). So, a 3 (WMC) x 2 (Task Demand) x 2 (MW
type) ANOVA was performed on the proportion of MW (intentional and unintentional).
There was a marginally significant main effect of WMC, F (2,69) = 2.469, p = .092, p2
= .067, showing that rates of MW were different among the WMC groups. There was a
main effect of task demand, F (1,69) = 4.351, p = .041, p2 = .059, showing that MW
occurred more often in the 3-back condition compared to the 1-back condition. There
was a significant main effect of MW type, F (1,69) = 27.771, p < .001, p2 = .287,
showing more reports of unintentional MW relative to intentional MW. There was a
marginally significant interaction between task demand and MW type, F (1,69) = 3.505,
p = .065, p2 = .048 (See Figure 4). A paired sample t-test revealed higher rates of
intentional MW in the 3-back condition compared to the 1-back condition, t (71) = 3.03,
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p = .004, d = .354 whereas there were no differences in the rates of unintentional MW
between the 1-back and 3-back conditions, t (71) = .321, p = .749, d = .038. There was
no significant interaction between WMC and task demand, F (2,69) = 1.00, p = .371, p2
= .028. There was also no significant interaction between WMC and MW type, F (2,69)
= .478, p = .622, p2 = .014. Lastly, there was no significant 3-way interaction, F (2,69) =
2.004, p =.143, p2 = .055 (See Figure 5). A post-hoc t-test revealed that the middle
WMC group showed higher rates of unintentional MW than the high WMC group in the
1-back condition, t (45) = 2.017, p = .05, d = .294. Additionally, there were higher rates
of intentional MW in the 3-back condition compared to the 1-back condition for the
middle WMC group=, t (25) = 3.427, p = .002, d = .685. Lastly there were no significant
differences among WMC groups in intentional MW for either task demand (p > .05).
Altogether, there were more rates of intentional MW in the 3-back task compared to the
1-back task, there were no differences for the rates of unintentional MW between the nback tasks. Lastly, individuals with middle WMC engaged in more unintentional MW in
the 1-back task compared to high WMC individuals and showed more intentional MW in
the 3-back compared to the 1-back condition.
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Figure 5: Intentional and Unintentional Mind-Wandering for Working Memory Capacity Groups

Correlations
The Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r) were computed to evaluate relationships
among accuracy and RT in n-back tasks, MW (Intentional, Unintentional and Overall),
On-task, WMC, motivation and MAAS, and they are shown in Table 2. There were
significant positive associations between accuracy and RT in the 3-back task, r (70) = .44,
p < .01, indicating a speed-accuracy-trade-off; however, this relationship was not
observed in the 1-back task. Accuracy in the 1-back condition was positively associated
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with on task, r (70) = .24, p < .05; subsequently, it was negatively associated with off-task,
r (70) = -.24, p < .05. In the 3-back condition, accuracy was also positively associated
with on-task, r (70) = .35, p < .05, negatively associated with off-task, r (70) = -.35, p <
.05 and with intentional MW, r (70) = -.28, p < .05. WMC was associated with accuracy in
the 3-back condition, r (70) = .33, p < .01 and in the 1-back condition, r (70) = .31, p <
.01. WMC was also positively associated with motivation, r (70) = .31, p < .01. Lastly,
motivation was positively associated with on-task in the 3-back condition, r (70) = .25, p
< .05 and MAAS, r (70) = .241, p < .05.

Table 2
Correlation Matrix
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1. Accuracy in 1-back
2. Reaction Time in 1-back

.23

3. Accuracy in 3-back

.45**

-.02

4. Reaction Time in 3-back

.33**

.51**

.44**

5. On-Task in 1-back

.24*

-.16

.17

6. Intentional in 1-back

-.15

.24*

.03

.22

-.51**

7. Unintentional in 1-back

-.14

-.02

-.22

-.13

-.69**

-.27*

8. Off-Task in 1-back

-.24*

.16

-.17

.05

-1**

.51**

.69**

-.048

9. On-Task in 3-back

.04

-.01

.35**

.03

.37**

-.10

-.33**

-.37**

10. Intentional in 3-back

-.02

-.23*

-.28*

-.14

-.24*

.28*

.04

.24*

-.57**

11. Unintentional in 3-back

-.02

.23

-.16

.08

-.22

-.13

.35**

.22

-.67**

-.23

12. Off-Task in 3-back

-.04

.01

-.35**

-.03

-.37**

.10

.33**

.37**

-1**

.57**

.67**

13. WMC

.31**

.13

.33**

-.01

.16

-.03

-.16

-.16

.10

-.05

-.08

-.10

14. Motivation

.19

.16

.17

.09

.05

-.02

-.04

-.05

-.01

-.01

.01

.01

.31**

15. Motivation 2

.08

.11

.21

.12

.14

-.02

-.14

-.14

.25*

-.18

-.13

-.25*

.18

.67**

16. MAAS

.15

.22

.16

.11

.07

-.06

-.03

-.07

.11

-.05

-.09

-.11

.13

.24*

Note: The correlation tables are bi-variate Pearson Rs; * p < .05, ** p < .01

Correlation coefficients are also computed for each WMC group to examine the
relationships between each MW type and accuracy in the 1-back and 3-back task. The
first hypothesis predicted that the high WMC group would show more intentional MW in
the 1-back condition, and their rate of MW would not be correlated with task performance.
The second hypothesis predicted that the low WMC group would show more unintentional
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.26*

MW in the 3-back condition, and their rate of MW would be negatively correlated with task
performance. The results of the previous analyses showed that the high WMC group did
not show more intentional MW in the 1-back condition. Their accuracy in the 1-back task
did not correlate with unintentional MW, r (19) = .14, p > .05 or intentional MW, r (19) = .15, p > .05. However, their accuracy was negatively correlated with unintentional MW in
the 3-back condition, r (19) = -.57, p < .01, which is opposite to the hypothesis. For the
low WMC group, the previous analyses showed that the rate of unintentional MW in the
3-back condition was not higher than that in the 1-back condition. Their accuracy in the
1-back task did not correlate with unintentional MW, r (23) = -.25, p > .05 or intentional
MW, r (23) = -.04, p > .05 . Additionally, accuracy in the 3-back task did not correlate with
unintentional MW, r (23) = -.03, p > .05 or intentional MW, r (23) = -.23, p > .05. For the
middle WMC group, the previous analyses showed that the rate of intentional MW was
higher in the 3-back task relative to the 1-back task. Their accuracy was negatively
correlated with intentional MW in the 1-back task, r (24) = -.58, p < .01 and in the 3-back
task, r (24) = -.52, p < .01.
Regarding other relationships not associated with the hypotheses, there was a
positive relationship between motivation and MAAS for the low WMC group, r (23) = .41,
p < .05. For the high WMC group, there were positive relationships between being ontask in the 3-back condition and motivation, r (19) = .44, p < .05 and MAAS, r (19) = .51,
p < .05. Lastly there was a negative relationship between motivation and MAAS, r (19) =
-.51, p < .01.
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix by Group
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

.14
.43*
.40*
.23
-.04
-.25
-.23
.00
-.04
.03
.00
.27
.25
.02

.03
.64**
-.15
.31
-.12
.15
.04
-.09
.02
-.04
.27
.15
.25

.53**
-.07
.27
-.18
.07
.17
-.23
-.03
-.17
.03
.12
.32

.06
.37
-.43*
-.06
.04
-.01
-.05
-.04
.18
.08
.21

-.60**
-.62**
-1**
.25
-.20
-.15
-.25
-.19
-.08
-.10

-.25
.60**
.09
.29
-.33
-.09
.07
.00
.04

.62**
-.39
-.05
.50*
.39
.16
.10
.08

-.25
.20
.15
.25
.19
.08
.10

-.56**
-.78**
-1**
-.26
.03
-.04

-.08
.56**
.11
-.03
.10

.78**
.23
-.02
-.02

.26
-.03
.04

.74**
.41*

.42*

.15
.29
.44*
.25
-.58**
.04
-.25
-.06
.06
.00
.06
-.18
-.29
.34

-.10
.29
-.14
.08
.10
.14
-.06
-.43*
.48*
.06
.07
-.15
.20

.60**
.22
-.38
-.03
-.22
.44*
-.52**
.09
-.44*
.00
.14
.12

-.05
-.28
.19
.05
.09
-.34
.25
-.09
-.14
-.14
.30

-.22
-.87**
-1**
.25
-.10
-.14
-.25
.23
.27
.07

-.28
.22
.00
.04
-.04
.00
-.03
-.19
-.23

.87**
-.25
.08
.16
.25
-.21
-.17
.05

-.25
.10
.14
.25
-.23
-.27
-.07

-.46*
-.50**
-1**
.17
.25
-.14

-.54**
.46*
-.02
-.15
.02

.50**
-.14
-.09
.12

-.17
-.25
.14

.67**
.35

.11

.34
.42
.03
-.02
.14
-.15
.02
.02
.00
-.03
-.02
-.09
.00

-.20
.59**
-.30
.33
-.01
.30
-.08
-.17
.26
.08
-.07
.30

.05
.13
.08
-.27
-.13
.26
.24
-.57**
-.26
.11
.10

-.27
.42
-.17
.27
-.17
.10
.13
.17
.32
.56**

-.70**
-.46*
-1**
.58**
-.44*
-.37
-.58**
-.21
.08

-.32
.70**
-.42
.58**
.02
.42
.00
.12

.46*
-.26
-.14
.47*
.26
.28
-.25

-.58**
.436*
.37
.58**
.21
-.08

-.66**
-.71**
-1**
.01
.44*

-.05
.66**
-.01
-.33

.71**
.00
-.28

-.01
-.44*

.45*

-.28

-.22

.51*

-.29

-.42

-.51*

-.46*

Low WMC
1. Accuracy in 1-back
2. Reaction Time in 1-back
3. Accuracy in 3-back
4. Reaction Time in 3-back
5. On-Task in 1-back
6. Intentional in 1-back
7. Unintentional in 1-back
8. Off-Task in 1-back
9. On-Task in 3-back
10. Intentional in 3-back
11. Unintentional in 3-back
12. Off-Task in 3-back
13. Motivation
14. Motivation 2
15. MAAS
Middle WMC
2. Reaction Time in 1-back
3. Accuracy in 3-back
4. Reaction Time in 3-back
5. On-Task in 1-back
6. Intentional in 1-back
7. Unintentional in 1-back
8. Off-Task in 1-back
9. On-Task in 3-back
10. Intentional in 3-back
11. Unintentional in 3-back
12. Off-Task in 3-back
13. Motivation
14. Motivation 2
15. MAAS
High WMC
2. Reaction Time in 1-back
3. Accuracy in 3-back
4. Reaction Time in 3-back
5. On-Task in 1-back
6. Intentional in 1-back
7. Unintentional in 1-back
8. Off-Task in 1-back
9. On-Task in 3-back
10. Intentional in 3-back
11. Unintentional in 3-back
12. Off-Task in 3-back
13. Motivation
14. Motivation 2
15. MAAS

.01
.18
-.09
-.32
.22
-.01
Note: The correlation tables are bi-variate Pearson Rs; * p < .05, ** p < .01
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CHAPTER THREE
DISCUSSION
The current study aimed to integrate two predominant theoretical frameworks
(i.e., executive failure model and resource demand model) for MW, while considering
task demand and intentionality of MW. It was hypothesized that individuals with higher
WMC would show higher rates of intentional MW in the low demanding condition
relative to individuals with lower WMC and that performance would not be impacted.
However, this hypothesis was not supported. Secondly, it was hypothesized that
individuals with lower WMC would show higher rates of unintentional MW in the highdemanding condition compared to individuals with higher WMC and that performance
would be impacted. The current findings did not support the hypothesis; however, there
were additional findings that provide further insight or speculation when differentiating
between intentional and unintentional MW with different attentional demands to a task.
The current study found that (1) individuals with higher WMC had better accuracy
in both the low and high demanding conditions, relative to individuals with lower WMC,
(2) there was more MW in the high demand condition, relative to the low demanding
condition, (3) there were higher rates of intentional MW in the high demand condition
relative to the low demand condition , (4) in the high demand condition, the middle
WMC showed a negative correlation between intentional MW and task performance,
(5) individuals with higher WMC were more likely to decline in accuracy when they
unintentionally mind-wandered in the high demand condition.
As expected, WMC was associated with task performance. The n-back task has
been associated with other working memory tasks (e.g., OSPAN) (Shelton, Metzger &
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Elliot, 2007). Specifically, the n-back tasks and working memory tasks used in the
current study both rely on an individual’s ability to manipulate information in working
memory. This further demonstrates a domain-general perspective when empirically
assessing working memory. In turn, the task demand manipulation was successful.
There were performance differences between the two conditions, such that accuracy
was better in the low demanding condition compared to the high demanding condition.
Secondly, RT was influenced by task demand, such that participants had shorter RT in
the low demanding task relative to the high demanding task. This is consistent with
previous studies (e.g., Miller et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2009) that showed increasing
memory load in the n-back task would cause RT to increase and accuracy to decrease.
Another important observation from the current study was the speed-accuracy-trade-off
in the 3-back condition, suggesting that when individuals were completing the 3-back
task, they took longer in accurately responding to target trials. Specifically, this pattern
was only observed in individuals with low and middle WMC, suggesting that individuals
with higher executive functions were able to be accurate without the need to take longer
to process and retrieve information from working memory.
Robison, Miller and Unsworth (2020), labeled MW as a complex and multifaceted
occurrence. The current study showed multiple factors that contribute to the occurrence
of overall, intentional, and unintentional MW in tasks that vary in attentional demands.
Past studies have shown that when tasks are easy (e.g., low on attentional demands),
MW would occur more often (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2009; Rummel & Boywitt; Seli et al.,
2016). However, this finding was not replicated in the current study. In n-back tasks,
there were more instances of MW in the high demanding condition, suggesting that MW
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occurred due to a failure in executive control. There are two possible explanations: (1)
the high demanding task taxed attentional resources resulting in a failure in goal
maintenance (i.e., perform the task), or (2) due to the complexity of the task, which
would facilitate the occurrence of MW. This was further supported with the negative
relationship between task performance and overall MW. So, when people mindwandered, there was a negative impact in task performance for both n-back conditions.
The current hypothesis on different rates between intentional and unintentional
MW in the low demanding task was not supported. Past research has found that
intentional MW is more likely to occur in a low demanding task (e.g., Ju & Lein, 2018;
Robison, Miller & Unsworth 2020; and Seli et al., 2016). There were higher rates of
intentional MW in high demand task compared to the low demand task, while there were
no differences in the rate of unintentional MW between conditions in the current study.
This is inconsistent with the idea that intentional MW occurs in a low demanding task
because subjects are aware that the task requires less resources, so they engage in
MW (e.g.,Seli, Carriere, Wammes et al., 2018). It is possible that intentional MW in a
high demanding task is endogenous and an individual has given up instead of them
being bored. Another explanation could be intentional MW is an incoherent category
(Murray & Krasich, 2019); furthermore, it was discussed that intentional MW could be
indistinguishable from other intentional mental activities (e.g., focused daydreaming,
motivated task-switching, personal goal processing). In the assumption that an
individual could focus on different tasks in a given moment, attention among tasks could
shift due to intent, while not being categorized as an episode of MW (Murry & Krasich,
2019). This assumption would make motivated tasks switching different from internal
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MW because they are reorganizing thought content based on relevance. Therefore, in
the high demanding condition, participants were more likely to shift attention to more
“relevant” tasks and categorized the mental state as “intentional” due to the
experimental manipulation in the current study. Subsequently, the motivated task
switching caused performance decline in the high demanding task.
The current study also showed that WMC impacted the relationship between
unintentional MW and accuracy in the high demanding task; such that for individuals
with higher WMC, as unintentional MW increased, accuracy was likely to decrease.
However, this was not observed for other WMC groups. This is contrary to the current
hypothesis, as it was expected that the negative association between unintentional MW
and accuracy in the high demand condition would be present with individuals with lower
WMC. Another important observation was that high WMC individuals that were more
motivated, had higher rates of on-task in the high demanding condition. This suggests
that individuals with higher cognitive abilities are more motivated to stay on task, so
when MW occurred, it was unintentional and had a negative impact on accuracy.
Motivation and trait mindfulness also had some indirect influence on accuracy
and individual difference in WMC in the current study. MW affected accuracy in both the
low and high demanding conditions; additionally, WMC was related to performance in
both conditions and motivation. Motivation was also associated with WMC and trait
mindfulness. Altogether, individuals with higher WMC were more motivated to complete
all tasks in the experiment, and mind-wandered less. While the relationship between
mindfulness traits and WMC was not observed in the study, observing the relationship
between mindfulness and motivation could imply that individual differences in executive
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functions play a role in individuals’ intrinsic motivation to be aware of task performance
or that motivation plays a role in executive functions. These connections are not
conclusive due to the lack of statistical significance among all three variables, but still
posits an interesting question on how motivation and WMC is related. However, this is
not consistent with the findings that showed no relationship between the WMC and
motivation (e.g., Robison & Unsworth, 2018; Robison, Miller & Unsworth, 2020). Future
research should elaborate more on these findings to determine theoretical importance.
The current study was able to provide partial evidence for the executive failure
model, showing that individuals with relatively lower cognitive abilities were more likely
to engage in MW; additionally, this relationship was independent of task demand. In
terms of differentiating between intentional and unintentional MW, the current study
failed to elaborate on past findings investigating the difference. However, unintentional
MW could be different from intentional MW, as indicated by WMC impacting the
relationship between unintentional MW and accuracy only in the high demanding task.
Additionally, other intrinsic individual differences (i.e., motivation and trait mindfulness)
contribute to an individual’s ability to sustain attention while performing tasks.

Limitations in the current study and Future research
Most of the hypotheses were not supported in the current study. The current
experiment only measured the occurrence of MW, without evaluating individual
differences in self-awareness of the MW episodes. Additionally, motivation was only
assessed at the end of the experiment instead of at the end of each task; therefore,
directly inferring on the relationship between task performance, WMC, or MW on
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motivation is not feasible. Lastly, the change in procedures for data collection could be
an additional contribution for most of the results in the current study. Specifically, the
study was conducted remotely via Eprime Go, instead of a controlled setting in the lab.
The current study adopted a within subject manipulation for task demand.
Previous studies that investigated MW and manipulated task demand used the same
procedures when testing their hypotheses (e.g., Ju & Yuu-Wen, 2018; Rummel &
Boywitt, 2014). However, there are past studies (e.g., Seli et al., 2016) that utilized a
between subject manipulation regarding task demand. While a within subject
manipulation has advantages in experimental designs, it is possible that the use of 1
and 3 back tasks were difficult for participant to differentiate, even though there were
appropriate instruction cues. Regarding the recording of MW, self-reported methods
have some limitations. Furthermore, it seems that the literature is relying heavily on the
participants’ ability to distinguish among on-task, intentionally MW, and unintentionally
MW. In other words, they assume that people are capable of cognitively monitoring
their mental state while performing a task, then accurately identify that mental
representation as attention has shifted from the task. Using self-caught methodology
could improve or fix this issue for future research.
In the future, to further investigate MW with a multifaceted approach, other
measures could be added. For example, Randall et al., (2019) and Xu and Metcalfe
(2016) argued that the relationship between task demand and MW are curvilinear. In
theory, in extremely low demanding tasks, individuals could be bored and able to
entertain off-task thoughts while having no influence on performance. Subsequently, in
high demanding tasks, MW would occur because the task is too difficult for them to
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keep their attention on the task. The current study did not address this curvilinear
relationship, but future research could investigate by adding multiple levels of difficulty
(i.e., 0-back, 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back). Additionally, measuring differences in State
and Trait Anxiety, mood, or depression could have been beneficial. It is evident that
when differentiating between intentional and unintentional there are different impact on
task performance and rates depending on WMC. Using a very low demanding task
could further test the idea that intentional MW occurs when a task is mundane and
requires no attentional resources.
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Thank you Participant ###
This study requires a working computer, running on Windows, with internet access. You most use the email that this
message was sent to, to participate in the current study. These emails should be affiliated with XXX.

Thank you for signing up and participating in the study! This study will include several programs to be downloaded and
completed. The suggested time for completing is 75-90 minutes. Please find a nice quiet environment before starting
and complete all tasks at once! It is vital that you take no breaks throughout series of tasks. Following are the
steps to complete this study is the suggested time frame mentioned above
1. For each program you will click on the link provided below, there should be an option to download the file.
2. Once downloaded click the arrow and option “keep”, do not “discard”. A window will pop up, click “more info” then “run
anyway”.
3. E-prime Go will then open asking for your participant number. Please use the provided participant number for all
experiments.
4. For the session number, put “1” for ALL tasks.
5. Read the consent form attached
6. Mark an X where there is a signature line and place the date of completion
Task One: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Up4c7iusMZtcYIrS5XqdEC65AA0Ie22K/view?usp=sharing
Task Two:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1x0jDads6nNeipxMcHICiI9q7uRe_mNuV/view?usp=sharing
Task Three:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LDvrXZfoCEOXnSQdQoIFFyCVzh1YVXmz/view?usp=sharing
Task Four A:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1OAcx35m1cIBp_h7cOjSYZNVp5Ei0qP5O
7. Once all tasks are complete, reply to this email with the zipped files that will be found in a folder labeled “E-Prime Go”
on your desktop.
8. Once I have received the data files, I will be sending the debriefing statement, and a few questionnaires.
9. Complete the forms and reply in the same email thread
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March 9, 2020

CSUSB INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Administrative/Exempt
Review
Determination Status: Determined
Exempt
IRB-FY2020-206

and Hideya Koshino
Department of CSBS - Psychology
California State University, San
Bernardino
5500
University
Parkway
San Bernardino, California 92407
Dear Hideya Koshino :
Your application to use human subjects, titled “Does working memory capacity modulate the relationship between task demand and intentional mind-wandering?”
has been reviewed and approved by the Chair of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of California State University, San Bernardino has determined that your
application meets the requirements for exemption from IRB review Federal requirements under 45 CFR 46. As the researcher under the exempt category you do
not have to follow the requirements under 45 CFR 46 which requires annual renewal and documentation of written informed consent which are not required for the
exempt category. However, exempt statusstill requires you to attain consent from participants before conducting your research as needed. Please ensure yourCITI
Human Subjects Training is kept up-to-date and current throughout the study.
Your IRB proposal ([FY2020-206]) is approved. You are permitted to collect information from [200] participants for [5 SONA credits or $10 Amazon credit] from
[SONA/CSUSB]. This approval is valid from [3/9/2020] to [3/8/2021].
The CSUSB IRB has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, except to weigh the risk to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to
potential risk and benefit. This approval notice does not replace any departmental or additional approvals which may be required.
Your responsibilities as the researcher/investigator include reporting to the IRB Committee the following three requirements highlighted below. Please note failure
of the investigator to notify the IRB of the below requirements may result in disciplinary action.
Submit a protocol modification (change) form if any changes (no matter how minor) are proposed in yourstudy for review and approval by the IRB before implemented
in your study to ensure the risk level to participants has not increased,
If any unanticipated/adverse events are experienced by subjects during your research, and Submit a study closure through the Cayuse IRB
submission system when your study has ended.
The protocol modification, adverse/unanticipated event, and closure forms are located in the Cayuse IRB System. If you have any questions regarding the IRB
decision, please contact Michael Gillespie, the Research Compliance Officer. Mr. Michael Gillespie can be reached by phone at (909) 537-7588, by fax at (909) 5377028, or by email at mgillesp@csusb.edu. Please include your application approval identification number (listed at the top) in all correspondence.
If you have any questions regarding the IRB decision, please contact Dr. Jacob Jones, Assistant Professor ofPsychology. Dr. Jones can be reached
by email at Jacob.Jones@csusb.edu. Please include your applicationapproval identification number (listed at the top) in all correspondence.
Best of luck
with

your

research.
Sincerely,
Donna Garcia
Donna Garcia, Ph.D., IRB
Chair CSUSB Institutional
Review Board
DG/
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